Lois Jean Osborn et al v. Carol Smith et al : Respondent Scalley\u27s Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1982
Lois Jean Osborn et al v. Carol Smith et al :
Respondent Scalley's Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
David E. Bean; Attorney for Appellants;
H. Ralph Klemm; Kent H. Murdock; Sumner J. Hatch; David B. Boyce; Richard Ruckenbroad;
Attorneys for Respondents;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Osborn v. Smith, No. 18159 (Utah Supreme Court, 1982).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2798
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate of 






CAROL SMITH and ELLA A. JOHNSON,: 
. Appellants. 









Case No. 18159 
RESPONDENT SCALLEY'S BRIEF 
DAVID E. BEAN 
SUMNER J. HATCH 
Attorney for Respondent, 
Nina O. Scalley 
72 East 400 South, #330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellants, 
Carol Smith and Ella Johnson 
190 South Fort Lane, Suite 2 
Layton, Utah 84041 
H. RALPH KLEMM 
Attorney for First Security 
Bank, Conservator 
175 South West Temple, #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
KENT H. MURDOCK Ff LED 
Attorney for Respondent, 
Lois Jean Osborn 
400 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
MAR 2 31982 
~····--·~-·--· ..... ·-··--~-·-·-~····•..tleiiliiiil 
Clerk. Supreme Court, Utah 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
GRACE M. ANDERSON, 
Deceased. 
CAROL SMITH and ELLA A. JOHNSON,: 
Appellants. 







Case No. 18159 
RESPONDENT SCALLEY'S BRIEF 
DAVID E. BEAN 
Attorney for Appellants, 
SUMNER J. HATCH 
Attorney for Respondent, 
Nina 0. Scalley 
72 East 400 South, #330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Carol Smith and Ella Johnson 
190 South Fort Lane, Suite 2 
Layton, Utah 84041 
H. RALPH KLEMM 
Attorney for First Security 
Bank, Conservator 
175 South West Temple, #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
KENT H. MURDOCK 
Attorney for Respondent, 
Lois Jean Osborn 
400 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411~ 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT . 
• 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ORDER VOIDING THE WILL AND THE DEEDS IS 
INVALID. 
POINT II 
THE ORDER VOIDING THE WILL AND DEEDS WAS NOT A 
FINAL DETERMINATION OF THEIR VALIDITY. 
POINT III 
RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL ARE 
INAPPLICABLE .. 
POINT IV 
THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT IN NO WAY VIOLATES 
THE LAW DESPITE THE PRIOR ORDER VOIDING THE WILL 
AND DEEDS .. 
POINT V 
PETITIONER SCALLEY IS NOT BOUND BY A COURT ORDER 
















Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Anderson v. Anderson, 
134 P. 533 (Utah 1913). 
In Re Estate of Mecham, 
437 P.2d 312 (Utah 1975) .. 
Johnson v. Johnson, 
336 P.2d 420 (Utah 1959) .. o 
McDonald v. Shaw, 
581 P.2d 1017 (Utah 1978). 
Peterson v. Peterson, 
530 P.2d 821 (Utah 1974) .. 
Richardson v. Grand Central Corporation, 
572 P.2d 395 (Utah 1977) ... 
State v. Horan, 
123 N.W.2d 488 (Wis. 1963) .. 
/ 
STATUTES AND CODES 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, § 75-2-501 .. 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, § 75-2-507 .. 
Utc;h Uniform Probate Code, § 75-5-42. 0 
79 Arn.Jur. 2d, § 5 , Wills. 
















Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from two cases that were consolidated on 
appeal, one a guardianship proceeding and the other a probate 
proceeding, for trial of issues determinative of the validity of 
a will executed November 28, 1977 by Grace M. Anderson, deceased. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After trial on the merits to the court, the court, 
Honorable J. Duffy Palmer, entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Order, Judgment, and Decree declaring the 
validity of the will of November 28, 1977, by Grace M. Anderson 
and admitting said will to probate. 
I 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Affirmance of the decision below. 
FACTS 
Appellants' Statement of Facts is inconsistent with the 
record as follows: 
1. K. o. Smith was not the nephew of Charles H. Anderson. 
He was not even a blood relative of Grace M. Anderson. He only 
claimed to be a long-time friend of hers. (G-5) 
2. The Stipulation in open court at the hearing on June 
28, 1977, had no terms and conditions, at that time, regarding 
further testamentary dispositions or deeds nor any requirement of 
-1-
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court approval. (G-49) Subsequently on July 30, 1977, a 
stipulation with certain terms and conditions was executed by the 
parties, (G-50), which were an afterthought on the part of the 
appellants for which there was no consideration. {Finding of Fact 
I I , R. , pp . 2 5 2 - 5 3 ) 
In other regards the Appellants' Statement of Facts is 
incomplete, as shown by Finding of Fact II, R., pp. 252-53, as 
follows: 
(a) That on or about the 17th day of May, 1977, 
Lois Jean Osborn petitioned the court for the removal of 
Kenneth O. Smith as guardian for Grace M. Anderson, an. 
aged person, and for the substitution of herself. (G-30) 
(b) That the parties agreed that tha~ issue would 
be resolved by the wishes of Grace M. Anderson. 
(c) That Grace M. Anderson chose Lois Jean Osborn. 
(d) That Gerald Hess prepared a stipulation to the 
change of guardian, which was executed by Kenneth O. Smith 
and Lois Jean Osborn on or about July 30, 1977. {G-50). 
(e) That on or about August 11, 1977, the Court 
issued an order incorporating the terms of the 
Stipulation. (G-54) 
{f) That on or about August 11, 1977, Lois Jean 
Osborn was appointed conservator for Grace M. Anderson, 
an aged person. {G-62) 
(g) That th~ actual purpose of the stipulation and 
Court Order referred to in paragraphs (d) and {e) above 
-2-
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was to satisfy Kenneth O. Smith's desire to receive 
notice of any subsequent wills or deeds of Grace M. 
Anderson rather than to raise any question regarding the 
competency of Grace M. Anderson to execute such documents. 
(h) That on or about February 14, 1978, Kenneth O. 
Smith petitioned the court to set aside the will of 
November 28, 1977, and two deeds that had also been 
executed by Grace M. Anderson on that date, because there 
had been no prior court approval. (G-63} 
(i) That David B. Boyce, attorney for the 
proponent, Lois Jean Osborn, had intended to present the 
deeds and will of November 28, 1977, to the court for 
approval but such had not been done prior to February 14, 
1978. (G-63) 
(j) That because there had not been prior court 
approval and with the understanding that a hearing would 
eventually be held to determine- the competency of Grace 
M. Anderson to execute the deeds and will of November 28, 
1977, or any other such documents, counsel for the 
proponent, Lois Jean Osborn, entered into a Stipuulation 
that resulted in the Court Order that they were void. 
(G-73, 98) 
(k) That on April 27, 1978, Lois Jean Osborn filed 
a petition with the court to have the court determine the 
competency of Grace M. Anderson to have executed the 
-3-
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deeds and will of Noyember 28, 1977, or any other such 
documents. (G-81) 
(1) That trial was scheduled on said petition for 
April 11, 1979, before Judge Swan, but ~Grace M. Anderson 
died on March 7, 1979. (G-138) 
{m) That the appointments of various guardians and 
conservators were because Grace M. Anderson was an aged 
person and not because she was incompetent and there 
never was, during the lifetime of Grace M. Anderson, 
any evidentiary hearing of any kind to determine her 
compentency. {G-1, 3-4, 13, 21-22, 30, 50, ·54, 62, 98, 
109-110} 
(n) That Judge Swan's order voiding the deeds and 
will of November 28, 1977, was issued summarily, upon 
stipulation, and in the absence of any prior hearing as 
to the competency of Grace M. Anderson. (G-73, 100) 
No transcript of the testimony was designated by the 
appellants as part of the record on appeal~ Therefore, the 
Findings of Fact of the trial court are conclusively presumed to 
be supported by the testimony given at the trial and such Findings 
of Fact are unassailable. McDonald v. Shaw, 581 P.2d 1017 (Utah 
19 7 8) • 
The only objection to the Findings of Fact by the 
appellants was to Finding of Fact II(g). (E-248) 
-4-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ORDER VOIDING THE WILL AND THE DEEDS IS INVALID 
The right or privilege of disposing of property by will 
is accorded by statute in all American jurisdictions, and although 
it is recognized that the right is a creature of statute, and 
subject to legislative control, the right is a valuable one and 
will be sustained wherever possible. 79 AM JUR.2d § 54, Wills. 
it has even been held that the right to make a will is a sacred 
and constitutional right. State v. Horan, 123 N.W.2d 488 
(Wis. 1963). The privilege has been characterized as a sacred, 
I 
untrammeled, valuable, and absolute right, and as a privilege 
guaranteed by law, although not with intent to place the privilege 
beyond control of the legislature. 79 AM JUR.2d § 5, Wills. 
In Utah the only statutory restrictions on the making of 
a will are contained in § 75-2-501, Utah Code Annotated 1953 as 
amended, as follows: "Any person 18 or more years of age who is 
of sound mind may make a will." Grace M. Anderson was more than 
18 years of age when she executed the will under date of November 
28, 1977, and it has been determined by the trial court that she 
was of sound mind when she executed it. In the case of Anderson 
v. Anderson, 134 P. 533 (Utah 1913), the Supreme Court of Utah 
-5-
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said that the right to make a will cannot be invaded or abrogated 
by the courts; only the legislature could do that. 
In the case at bar, the appellants are contending that 
the valuable right of Grace M. Anderson to execute a will should 
be abrogated by an interim order of the trial court even though 
the trial court subsequently determined, in the only evidentiary 
hearing, that she was competent when the will was executed. Her 
competency is not being contested in this appeal. 
The facts surrounding the order voiding the will are 
essential to understand why the interim order should in no way be 
used to abrogate the valuable right of the decedent ·to make her 
own determination of the disposition of her propert~. On May 17, 
1977, Lois Jean Osborn executed a petition for the removal of 
K. O. Smith as guardian and the appointment of herself as guardian 
for Grace M. Anderson, an aged person. (G-30; Finding of Fact 
II(a), R. p. 252) K. O. Smith and Lois Jean Osborn agreed that 
that issue would be resolved by the wishes of Grace M. Anderson. 
(Finding of Fact II(b), id.) Grace M. Anderson chose Lois Jean 
Osborn to be guardian. {G-49; Finding of Fact II(c), id.) No 
other conditions were imposed at that time with regard to future 
wills or deeds. (G-49) Subsequently a stipulation, which required 
court approval of wills and deeds, was prepared to change the 
guardian. (G-50; Finding of Fact II(d), id.) On August 11, 1977, 
the court issued an order ~ncorporating the terms of the 
-6-
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stipulation. (G-54; Finding of Fact II(f), id.} The trial court 
found the purpose of the stipulation and order was to give notice 
to K. 0. Smith of any subsequent deeds or wills of Grace M. 
Anderson. (Findings of Fact II(g}, id.) 
Grace M. Anderson executed the deeds and will of 
November 28, 1977, prior to giving notice to K. o. Smith and prior 
to petitioning the court for approval. This was so the court 
would be able to see what it was being requested to approve. 
The respondents had intended to present the deeds and will of 
November 28, 1977, to the court for approval but had not done so 
at the time that the appellants petitioned the court to set them 
aside. (Finding of Fact II (i), R., p. 253). 
I 
I 
Even if K. O. Smith had been given notice of the deeds 
and the will of November 28, 1977, and had the court been 
petitioned before their execution for approval, no determination 
of validity would have or should have been made because it is 
improper to do so until after the death of the testator. This is 
because wills are ambulatory in nature and can be revoked until 
death. Ther~fore, a will can only be contested after death. 
Johnson v. Johnson, 336 P.2d 420 (Utah 1959). 
In the only objection to the Findings of Fact, the 
appellants contend that the purpose of the stipulation that notice 
be given to K. o. Smith, the previous guardian, was to give him a 
chance to have a competency examination of Grace M. Anderson if 
-7-
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she executed deeds or a new will. (E~ 248) Even if Smith had been 
given notice, that may not have given him the right to require her 
to submit to a mental examination. Even if Smith could require 
Grace M. Anderson to submit to a mental examination, that would 
only be so that he could attempt to preserve evidence of 
competency until after her death, since competency cannot be 
decided until then. Johnson v. Johnson, supra. In reality Smith 
did have the requested mental examination. Grace M. Anderson was 
examined by Dr. Jack Tedrow regarding her mental competency on the 
12th day of June, 1978. That was not long after the will and 
deeds and could have been sooner if the appellants had exercised 
their rights under Rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
I 
I 
So the appellants got all they were entitled to even 
under their explanation for the purpose of the notice requirement 
in the stipulation. Even if they had not been allowed to examine 
Grace M. Anderson, that would not make the deeds and will void. 
The valuable right of the decedent to execute the deeds 
and will cannot be abrogated on the facts of this case. The 
primary reason is that the order was not a final determination nor 
was it intended to be. (See Point II below.) Furthermore, the 
stipulation was not made by the decedent, Grace M. Anderson. Both 
the stipulation requiring court approval for the deeds and will 
and the stipulation voiding the deeds and will for lack of court 
approval were made by David B. Boyce. The appellants contend that 
. 
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he was the attorney for Lois Jean Osborn and not Grace M. Anderson. 
(G-112) In Finding of Fact II(i), he is found to be the attorney 
for Lois Jean Osborn. On November 15, 1978, K. O. Smith, one of 
the appellants, filed a motion for the appointment of an attorney 
for Grace M. Anderson. (G-111) On November 30, 1978, the court 
ordered that an attorney be appointed to represent Grace M. 
Anderson. (G-116) That took place after the execution of the 
deeds and will. (G-119-120) So Grace M. Anderson was apparently 
unrepresented when the stipulations were executed and was not a 
party to the stipulations that resulted in the order voiding the 
will and deeds. 
Not only was Grace M. Anderson not a party to the 
I 
stipulations that resulted in the court orders, but Nina O. 
Scalley, one of the primary residuary beneficiaries under the 
will, will not represented and was not a party to the stipulations. 
(G-50) So the stipulations and resulting court orders are 
ineffective because they were not made by the testatrix, who was 
competent, or her attorney, and they were not made by one of the 
primary beneficiaries of the will. 
The recognized methods for revocation of a will are set 
forth in§ 75-2-507, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. It 
states as follows: 
(1) A will or any part thereof is revoked: 
-9-
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(a) By a subsequent will which revokes the 
prior will or part expressly or by 
inconsistency; or 
(b) By being burned, torn, canceled, 
obliterated or destroyed, with the 
intent and for the purpose of revoking 
it by the testator or by another person 
in his presence and by his direction. 
The stipulation and order voiding the will would not have been 
valid even if the testatrix had so stipulated because such was not 
a recognized method for revocation. 
It should be noted that the statutory provisions for 
revocation all require the intent of the testatrix. There is 
nothing in the record in this case to show that the ·testatrix 
intended to revoke the will of November 28, 1977. 
I 
I 
The app~llants contend that under § 75-5-42 of the 
Uniform Probate Code, the court had jurisdiction and power to void 
the will and deeds. That statute is immaterial because the will 
and deeds were not voided because of the statute. That statute 
provides for the voiding of any sale or encumbrance to a 
conservator of any transaction which is affected by a substantial 
conflict of interest. There was no sale or encumbrance to the 
conservator and there is no evidence of any transaction affected 
by a substantial conflict of interest. The order voiding the will 
and deeds was based on the stipulation and had nothing to do with 
that statute. 
-10-
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In paragraph 1 of Point II of the appellants' brief, they 
state that the provisions of the stipulation which required court 
approval were conditions precedent to the change of guardianship. 
' 
If that is the case, then the remedy the appellants should have 
sought when the stipulation was allegedly violated, was· to seek a 
rescission of the stipulation. In other words, K. o. Smith was 
stipulating that Lois Jean Osborn could become the guardian if all 
future deeds and wills were presented to the court for approval. 
Even assuming that the stipulation was breached, the remedy for 
the appellants would be to rescind the stipulation approving of 
the change in guardian. A violation of the stipulation does not 
make the deeds and will invalid. This can be illustrated by 
I 
referring to other provisions of the stipulation. For example, 
the stipulation provided that Lois Jean Osborn would post a bond, 
that she would render an accounting and that before Grace M. 
Anderson was placed in a nursing home, there would be court 
approval. Under the rationale of the appellant, if Lois Jean 
Osborn had failed to post a bond or had failed to render an 
account or had placed Grace M. Anderson in a nursing home without 
.court approval, then the deeds and will would be invalid. Such 
logic does not follow. The court order requiring court approval 
for future wills and deeds did not say that any such deeds and 
will would be invalid without court approval. (G-54) 
-11-
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POINT II 
THE ORDER VOIDING THE WILL AND DEEDS WAS NOT A FINAL 
DETERMINATION OF THEIR VALIDITY 
Even assuming that the stipulations and orders were valid 
and that Grace M. Anderson could be required to get court approval 
for the deeds and will, there was a petition pending and trial 
date set when Grace M. Anderson died to acquire that court 
approval. (G-81) The fact that the testatrix died before the 
issues were decided does not resolve the matter; it simply 
postponed the decision until after her deathe (Actually, that 
was the only proper time to have determined competency anyway. 
Johnson v. Johnson, supra) If she was competent and not acting 
I • 
under undue influence, then the will and deeds are valid. Court 
approval was eventually obtained at the trial of this matter 
wherein the court determined that Grace M. Anderson was competent 
to execute the deeds and will of November 18, 1977, and that she 
was not unduly influenced in so doing. (E-251-258) 
The appellants contend that the record does not reflect 
the understanding that a hearing would eventually be held to 
determine the competency of Grace M. Anderson to execute the deeds 
and will. Findings of Fact II(i-1) clearly reflects that intent 
and understanding and those findings are unassailable due to lack 
of a transcript. McDonald v. Shaw, 581 P.2d 1017 {Utah 1978). 
-12-
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The order of the court under date of August 11, 1977, 
says in part as follows: 
4. That as guardian of the estate of Grace 
M. Anderson, Lois Jean Osborn shall not sell or 
otherwise transfer or dispose of any real 
property of Grace M. Anderson without first 
petitioning and obtaining approval of this Court. 
• • • • 
6. Lois Jean Osborn shall not sign any 
trusts or any testamentary devises for Grace M. 
Anderson, nor shall Grace M. Anderson sign any 
such documents for herself without first 
petitioning and obtaining approval of this Court 
(emphasis added). (G-54) 
So the order itself contemplated the possibility of a hearing to 
determine the competency of Grace M. Anderson to execute the deeds 
and w~ll. From the language of the order itself, it is apparent 
that even Judge Swan did not consider his order to be final. He 
would not have set the matter on the trial calendar if he thought 
the order was final. 
On April 27, 1978, Lois Jean Osborn execut~d a petition 
that was filed with the court on May 1, 1978, which says in part 
as follows: 
2. That Grace M. Anderson is under Court 
order not to sign any trusts or testamentary 
devises without first petitioning and obtaining 
approval of the Court and she desires to have the 
Court make such approval and in connection 
therewith, to determine that Grace M. Anderson 
has the capacity to execute trusts or 
testamentary devises and to execute deeds and 
similar documents. Wherefore, your petitioner 
-13-
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prays that . • • an order be entered approving 
testamentary devises executed by Grace M. 
Anderson and giving her the right to execte 
trusts, testamentary devises, deeds or similar 
instruments in the future without further court 
approval (emphasis added). (G-81-82) 
At the time of the petition, the will and deeds of November 28, 
1977, had already been executed. So the petition was a petition 
to approve of the deeds and will of November 28, 1977. The court 
then scheduled a hearing for October 12, 1978, on the petition to 
consider conf irrning those documents that she had executed. {G-89) 
At the hearing on October 12, 1978, the issues raised by the 
petition were assigned to the trial calendar. (G-94) On January 
4, 1979, a request for trial setting was filed with the court. 
(G-12~) Pursuant to the request for trial setting, notice of 
pretrial was filed January 8, 1979, setting pretrial for January 
29, 1979. (G-122) Notice of trial was filed with the court 
February 9, 1979, wherein trial was scheduled for April 11, 1979. 
(G-138) Grace M. Anderson died on March 7, 1979, before the trial 
was held. In light of these facts, it is difficult to imagine how 
the appellants can contend that the record does not reflect that a 
hearing would eventually be held to determine the competency of 
Grace M. Anderson to execute the deeds and will of November 28, 
1977. 
For the reason that it was contemplated by the court and 
by the parties that a hearing would eventually be held to 
-14-
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determine the validity or invalidity of the deeds and will, there 
was no need for the respondents to appeal from Judge Swan's order 
nor was there any need for any reservation pursuant to Rule 72 of 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The appellants conclude Point I of their argument by 
asking the following question: "How do you void the deeds and 
will by stipulation of the parties while Grace M. Anderson is 
alive and then resurrect the will when she is dead?'~ The answer 
to that question is simple and in the answer is the resolution of 
this appeal. The answer is that the voiding of the deeds and will 
by stipulation (assuming the Court order is valid) was only a 
preliminary or interim order that may have made them void until a 
I 
heari~g was held. They are "resurrected" after death because the 
hearing was not held until after her death. After her death, at 
the only evidentiary hearing ever held regarding competency, it 
was determined that she was competent, which has not been 
challenged by Appellants. 
POINT III 
RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL ARE INAPPLICABLE 
The appellants contend that the order voiding the will 
and deeds is res judicata or that the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel applies to prevent the trial judge from overruling that 
order. Those doctrines are entirely inapplicable in this case. 
-15-
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They have to do with the relitigation of issues in the interest of 
judicial economy. To relitigate something obviously requires a 
previous litigaton. There was no previous litigation in this 
case. The issues were only heard once and that was at the trial. 
Finding of Fact II(m) is as follows: 
(m} That the appointments of various 
guardians and conservators were because Grace M. 
Anderson was an aged person and not because whe 
was incompetent and there never was, during the 
lifetime of Grace M. Anderson, any evidentiary 
hearing of any kind to determine her competency. 
(G-1, 3-4, 13, 21-22, 30, SO, 54, 62, 98, 
109-110) 
The appellants recite the four basic essentials of the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel on page 13 as follows: 
, 
, 
1. Was the issue decided in the prior adjudica-
tion identical with the one presented in the 
action in question? 
2. Was the final judgment on the merits? 
3. Was the party against whom the plea is 
asserted a party in privity with the party 
to the prior adjudication? 
4. Was the issue in the first case competently, 
fully, and fairly litigated? 
The answers to those questions show the inapplicability 
of that doctrine in this case. In answer to question No. 1, the 
issues were not decided in connection with the order voiding the 
will and deeds. So it cannot be said that the issue decided in 
the prior adjudication is identical with the one presented in this 
action. 
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The second essential element of the doctrine is to have a 
final judgment on the merits. The order voiding the will and 
deeds was obviously not the final determination since a trial was 
scheduled to make that determination. 
The fourth element is that the issues be competently, 
fully and farily litigated in the first case. There was no first 
case. So the issues were not even litigated before the trial of 
this matter, let alone competently, fully, and fairly. 
POINT IV 
THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT IN NO WAY VIOLATES THE LAW 
DESPITE THE PRIOR ORDER VOIDING THE WILL AND DEEDS 
I 
I . 
This is not a situation where the judge of one division 
of the same court is overruling an order of another judge. Judge 
Palmer, in trying the case, was simply doing what Judge Swan would 
have done had he still been on the bench. and that was having the 
hearing that was always contemplated and that Judge Swan scheduled 
to determine the right of Grace M. Anderson to execute the will 
and deeds. Judge Palmer was not reviewing Judge Swan's order. 
In In re Estate of Mecham, 537 P.2d 312 (Utah 1975}, this 
Court allowed Judge Taylor to make an order changing a previous 
order of Judge Jeppson because Judge Taylor had jurisdiction for 
what he did. In the case at bar, Judge Palmer certainly had 
jurisdiction to have the hearing that Judge Swan authorized and 
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could have heard himself had he been on the bench when it came on 
for hearing. Once the matter was placed on the trial calendar, it 
was triable by any of the judges in the district. It was always 
contemplated that the interim order could be changed. 
In Peterson v. Peterson, 530 P.2d 821 (Utah 1974), this 
Court said that it is not impossible under some circumstances for 
one district judge to vacate the orders of his colleagues. In 
Richardson v. Grand Central Corporation, 572 P.2d 395 (Utah 1977), 
the Supreme Court of Utah said that preliminary or interim rulings 
do not rise to the dignity of res judicata. The Court went on to 
say that the ruling of one judge as to the sufficiency or effect 
of pleadings does not prevent another division of the court from 
I 
considering that same question of law if it is properly involved 
on a subsequent motion which presents the case in a different 
light, as in this case. 
POINT V 
PETITIONER SCALLEY IS NOT BOUND BY A COURT ORDER 
IN A PROCEEDING TO WHICH SHE WAS NOT A PARTY. 
Petitioner Scalley was not a party to Probate No. 1-3347 
and thus cannot be bound by an order premised and founded upon a 
stipulation entered into by the parties to that action. That she 
was a residual beneficiary under the November 28, 1977, will of 
Grace M. Anderson does not.come close to placing her in privity to 
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the position of Petitioner Osborn in the guardianship proceeding. 
Furthermore, the question of privity doesn't even arise in this 
case because no litigation of issues occurred until the trial of 
this matter. Thus the summary order of Judge Swan based upon a 
stipulation she did not sign cannot bind her. 
CONCLUSION 
The right to dispose of property by will is a valuable 
right to be upheld wherever possible. Only the legislature, and 
not the courts, can abrogate that valuable right. The legislature 
in Utah has given the right to everyone over the age of 18 who is 
of sound mind. In the only evidentiary hearing regarding the 
competency of Grace M. Anderson, it has been determined that she 
was competent on November 28, 1977, the date of the execution of 
the will and deeds. 
The only possible reason to invade her right to make her 
will would be the order requiring court approval and the order 
voiding the deeds and will. Those orders should not·invalidate 
the deeds and. will because (1) the order voiding the deeds and 
will was an interim order not intended to be final; (2) competency 
cannot be determined until death; (3) the purpose claimed by the 
appellants for the requirement that notice be given to them of any 
subsequent deeds or will was complied with in that they were able 
to have a mental examination of Grace M. Anderson; (4) the 
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stipulations resulting in the order requiring court approval and 
the order voiding the deeds and will were not entered into by the 
testatrix or her attorney or by one of the primary beneficiaries 
under the will; (5) the order voiding the deeds and will is not 
one of the recognized statutory methods for revocation of a will; 
and (6} notice was simply a condition precedent and failure to 
give notice would only allow a rescission of the change of 
guardianship, but would not void the deeds and will. 
Even if the order voiding the deeds and will is valid, it 
was only a preliminary order awaiting a final determination. 
There is no question from the record on appeal that -a hearing to 
determine the validity of the will and deeds of November 28, 1977, 
was anticipated even after the order voiding them. At that final 
determination, it was concluded that Grace M. Anderson was 
competent and was not unduly influenced in the making of the deeds 
and will. 
Since there is no question that Grace M. Anderson was 
competent and was not unduly influenced in the making of the deeds 
and will of November 28, 1977, there is no valid reason why the 
deeds and will should not be determined to be valid and the will 
should be admitted to probate as the Last Will and Testament of 
Grace M. Anderson. 
DATED this day of March, 1982. 
Sumner J. Hatch 
Attorney for Responden~ 
Nina~ ~~~~~~~ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this day of March, 1982, 
two copies of the foregoing RESPONDENT SCALLEY'S BRIEF were 
mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, to each of the following: 
Kent H. Murdock, Esq. 
400 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
David E. Bean, Esq. 
190 South Fort Lane, Suite 2 
Layton, Utah 84041 
H. Ralph Klemm, Esq. 
175 South West Temple, #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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